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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRYSLER DODGE COUNTRY, USA INC., * 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
* 
vs. 
LOUISE CURLEY, 
* 
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* 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff concurs in the jurisdiction statement of the 
Defendant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff concurs in the Defendant's description of the 
nature of the proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Plaintiff concurs in the statement of issues presented by 
the Defendant for appeal. In doing so the Plaintiff suggests to 
the Court of Appeals that there are insufficient facts on which 
to base these legal issues raised on appeal. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Plaintiff concurs in the citation of determinative statutes. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case: Plaintiff concurs in Defendant's 
description of the nature of the case. 
b. Course of Proceedings: Plaintiff concurs in Defendant's 
description of the course of proceedings. 
c. Disposition at Trial Court: Plaintiff concurs in 
Defendant's description of the disposition at trial court. 
d. Relevant Facts: Plaintiff in significant part disagrees 
that the facts presented by the Defendant's brief are adequate to 
explain the trial court's ruling in this case. 
The Defendant purchased the vehicle and entered into a 
standard vehicle financing arrangement with Chrysler Credit. 
Defendant testified that she moved from Tremonton, Utah to 
various locations in New Mexico. TR at 61-62. First she lived 
one month in Gallop. TD at 62. Then she moved to Tofagai and 
lived there three months. Id. Finally she moved back to Gallop. 
Id. She testified that she was living there at the date of 
trial. Id. Evidently, she maintained a post office box in a 
town eight miles west of Gallop called Mittmore. Id at 42. 
However, at some time she let her brother-in-law, Ernest 
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Hawthorne, have the car. Id at 43. She testified he was 
supposed to make the payments and she gave the car to him. Id at 
43-44. She testified that her last payment was in September or 
October of 1986. Id at 43. Evidently the brother-in-law lived 
in Brimhall, New Mexico about an hour's drive from where 
Defendant resided. Id at 45-46. 
She testified that at a later date her brother-in-law told 
her the car was picked up for non-payment. TR at 52. She 
testified that she didn't have any money so she didn't make any 
contact or take any action. Id at 53. There is no evidence that 
the truck was on the reservation when Chrysler Credit 
repossessed. 
It is clear that the Plaintiff was not present at the 
repossession and had no personal knowledge of where the 
repossession occurred. TR at 52. Further, Plaintiff did not 
know whether or not the Navajo Court authorized the repossession. 
TR at 52. The trial court specifically noted this lack of 
evidence in ruling in the case. Id at 73-74. It is clear that 
the Plaintiff had no involvement, knowledge or participation 
whatsoever in the retrieval of the automobile. That is 
uncontested in the factual record. TR at 6-8. Furthermore there 
is no evidence as to whether Defendant's brother-in-law consented 
to the repossession. But Defendant does say that "he [brother-
in-law] let them take it." TR at 46. 
The vehicle was delivered in rough condition by Chrysler 
Credit to Plaintiff. TR at 9-10, 55-56. Plaintiff repaired and 
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cleaned the vehicle. Id at 14. Then the vehicle was placed on 
the car lot for sale. The vehicle was advertised and shown to 
prospective purchasers. Id at 13-14, 19/ 34-38. Since there was 
little interest in the vehicle, it was then offered to other 
dealers and bids were obtained. Id at 13, 17. 
Plaintiff attempted to notify the Defendant that the vehicle 
would be sold and a deficiency could result. TR at 20. Exhibit 
#9 was sent to Box 141 in Brimhall addressed to Louise Curley, 
certified mail, return receipt requested. This was the address 
of Defendant's brother-in-law from which payments were being 
made. Id at 47-49. Defendant knew and assumed that was the 
address being used, for correspondence "I assumed that... you 
know". Id at 48. 
Plaintiff in good faith sent the notice to that address. 
The return receipt came back with "Louise Curley" signed as 
having received Exhibit #9. See Exhibit #9, green slip. The 
Defendant testified she didn't see the letter and didn't sign the 
green slip. TR at 49. She thought her brother-in-law wrote her 
name. JEd. Plaintiff learned of this situation at the trial; it 
had no way of knowing that Defendant had not received Exhibit #9. 
The court specifically found, after reviewing the entire 
situation, evidence that the "notice given for the sale was 
reasonable under the circumstances". TR at 73. Further "that 
the sale was commercially reasonable." jrd. Lastly, "that no 
greater value could have been obtained by any other method". Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SHOWING PLAINTIFF'S VIOLATION 
OF NAVAJO TRIBAL LAW. 
(1) The record is completely silent whether Defendant or 
her brother-in-law are Navajo Indians. (2) There is no credible 
evidence where the car was located when repossessed. (3) There 
is no evidence as to whether or not a Navajo Nation court order 
was obtained. (4) Plaintiff had no involvement or connection 
with the repossession. 
Point II. PLAINTIFF'S REPOSSESSION SALE WAS IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE COMMERCIAL CODE. 
The trial court's factual finding of "reasonable notice 
under the circumstance" followed by a "commercially reasonable" 
sale and that " no greater value could be obtained by any other 
method" are supported in the record. They are not clearly 
erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SHOWING PLAINTIFF'S VIOLATION 
NAVAJO TRIBAL LAW. 
The law quoted by the Defendant on appeal starts with these 
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words, "The personal property of Navajo Indians shall". The 
statute is clearly restricted to personal property of Navajo 
Indians. There is no evidence anywhere in the record that 
Defendant is a Navajo Indian. There is no evidence that her 
brother-in-law is a Navajo Indian. 
The Navajo law quoted by Defendant restricts repossession 
activities in the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation. 
There is no credible evidence where this vehicle was repossessed. 
There is no evidence whether or not an order was obtained 
from the Ncivajo Court. Plaintiff was not involved so it simply 
does not know. There is no evidence as to whether Defendant's 
brother-in-law, the evident purchaser, gave written consent to 
repossess. Or alternatively, whether the car was within the 
"territorial jurisdiction" when repossessed. Plaintiff again was 
not involved so it does not know. The lack of any discovery 
efforts by Defendant leaves the record without development on 
these issues. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant presented the 
answers. The record is simply blank. 
Another question arises. Even if a car were proven to be on 
the reservation does that mean it is within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation. The answer to that question 
is not available. No court can assume or take judicial notice of 
the statutes which answer this question. The trial court was 
never givem any basis on which to determine this question. Rule 
201, Utah Rules of Evidence. Judge Perry, the trial judge, had 
no way of knowing the answer and neither does this Court of 
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Appeals. There is proof needed and it is wholly lacking. Hunt 
v. Monroe, 32 Utah 424, 91 P 269 (1907); Home Brewing Co. v. 
American Chem Ozokerrte Co., 58 Utah 219, 198 P 170 (192U: Maple 
v. Maple, 566 P2d 1229 (Utah 1977). See, e.g., Whitmore Oxygen 
Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission., 114 Utah 1, 196 P2d 976 
(1948). 
More obvious is the fact that this Plaintiff had absolutely 
nothing to do with the retrieval of car from whom and from where 
it was. Plaintiff's duty to repurchase the car arises only when 
Chrysler Credit delivers it to Plaintiff's property in Logan. 
There is no legal basis whatsoever to suggest Plaintiff violated 
any law even if Chrysler Credit did. That party is not and has 
never been involved in this case. Furthermore there is no 
evidence of any agency relationship with the Plaintiff. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF'S REPOSSESSION SALE WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE COMMERCIAL CODE. 
The trial court carefully examined Plaintiff's sale 
procedures. It specifically found them to be "commercially 
reasonable" and that "a higher price could not be obtained with 
any other method." T.R. at 73. 
Defendant suggests that the Court of Appeals should remove 
the trial court from factual evaluation and determination in 
these cases. Defendant wants an arbitrary legal standard. 
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Defendant suggests that trial courts are not capable of 
evaluating circumstances and determining "reasonableness". The 
Defendant is suggesting that some standard other than "clearly 
erroneous" be used in evaluating these factual determinations. 
Defendant suggests this was a "private sale". In fact, the 
vehicle was offered and advertised publicly for some time. Only 
when there were no inquiries or interest did Plaintiff show it to 
other dealers. After getting their fair evaluation of market 
value, Plaintiff did sell it to Davis Chrysler Dodge for the 
highest bid. The Defendant wholly failed to prove the price was 
inadequate or suggest any different way to have sold the vehicle. 
There is clearly a recognized market for used cars and 
widely distributed standard price quotations. Courts have 
disagreed with whether used cars can be sold to the secured party 
in a private sale. Utah has no decision on this issue. In any 
event, this was not a private sale. Plaintiff did everything 
possible to sell the vehicle by advertising and showing it on its 
used car lot. Only when this failed did it get bids. That does 
not make it a private sale. 
It is true that Defendant evidently did not get the notice, 
Exhibit #9. Defendant is not blameless in this regard. When she 
learned of the repossession she made no effort to contact anyone. 
Clearly her brother-in-law breached his contract with her. His 
apparent forgery of her name on the return receipt shows his 
disregard for her position. Plaintiff can be expected to 
reasonably rely on such a signature. Plaintiff has no way to 
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avoid being tricked by such a signature. It appears that 
Plaintiff made reasonable effort to notify the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
There is simply no basis in this record justifying a 
reversal of the trial court's decision. "Commercial 
reasonableness" as adjudged by the experienced trial judge falls 
within the legal parameters defined in Utah decisions. The 
important and novel issue in this case involves the juxtaposition 
of Navajo tribal law. On this count, Defendant has failed to 
develop the necessary evidentiary basis or to prove Plaintiff's 
complicity in such a violation. 
A circuit court in Logan, Utah can hardly be expected to 
enforce Navajo tribal law (which it learns nothing of) against a 
Plaintiff who never went near the New Mexico Navajo Reservation. 
In this case there is no evidence that Defendant is a Navajo. 
There is no credible evidence where the truck was located. There 
is no evidence as to the relationship between reservation and 
territorial jurisdiction. Perhaps Chrysler Credit a non-party 
did get an order. Perhaps brother-in-law did give written 
consent. Defendant has simply failed to erect the factual basis 
on which this court might reach the legal issues raised in 
Defendant's Brief. 
Plaintiff requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the 
decision, awarding costs and attorneys fees on appeal to the 
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Plaintiff. 
DATED this / day of October, 1988. 
DAINES & KANE 
N. George Daines 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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